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THE COURTS AND THE RULEMAKING
PROCESS: THE LIMITS OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW
J. Skelly Wrightt
[T]hat the judiciary should presume to impose its own methods
on administrative or executive officers is a usurpation. And the
assumption that the methods of natural justice are ex necessitate
those of Courts of justice is wholly unfounded.
Lord Shaw in
Local Government Board v. Arlidge
L1915] A.C. 120, 138.
Administrative law has entered an age of rulemaking. Administrators who once acted on whim and instinct have been
judicially constrained to promulgate and adhere to consistent
guidelines.' Agencies which once generated policy in a piecemeal
fashion through adjudication are now adopting prospective standards of action valid in a number of different settings and against a
wide variety of "parties."2 And the new agencies established by
Congress to deal with contemporary environmental, economic, and
energy problems have relied heavily on the promulgation of general regulations. 3 These are healthy and welcome developments.
t Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
' See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Holmes v. New York City
Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir.
1964).
2 For instance, the Federal Power Commission (FPC), overwhelmed by the task of
setting rates in case-by-case adjudications, has begun to establish area-wide rates. See, e.g.,
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968). The FPC has also started to establish
maximum rate rules covering a number of parties. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 469 F.2d
130 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973). The Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), in a major change of position, may also be ready to exercise some rulemaking
powers. See National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in partnership with state
governments, is authorized to establish air quality standards governing many major indus-
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Arguably, some areas of the economy should be deregulated to
give fuller play to competitive market forces; 4 and one may doubt
that Congress is always wise to delegate to the executive branch and
to administrative agencies the responsibility for making fundamerital decisions about the economy and the environment. 5 But when
Congress has adopted a regulatory solution, and when the Delegation Doctrine does not bar that solution, the case for making
administrative policy through rules, rather than adjudicatory decisions, is overwhelming.
Trial-like adjudication is extremely costly in time, staff, and
money. Before an adjudicatory common law can acquire coherence, conditions typically will have overtaken it. As a consequence,
industries subject to adjudicatory regulation are left in a state of
perpetual uncertainty, and agencies assume the dangerous power
to create new law affecting parties selected at random, or in a
discriminatory manner. Orderly innovation is difficult, and
emergencies often go unmet. To discern basic agency policy, the
public must wade through volumes of scarcely relevant testimony
and findings. The technicalities of adjudication allow lawyers to
minimize the input of experts and to frustrate agency consideration of relevant scientific and economic perspectives. Regulation
becomes an advocate's game. Especially in the rapidly expanding
realms of economic, environmental, and energy regulation, the
policy disputes are too sharp, the technological considerations too
complex, the interests affected too numerous, and the missions too
urgent for agencies to rely on the ponderous workings of adjudication.
tries and most areas of the United States. Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-3 to -7
(1970). The four "phases" of the current round of wage-price control have involved
rulemaking of an even more farreaching character. The extent to which "legislative" power
has been delegated to the Executive to allow him to manage the economy may be gleaned
from the language of the seminal Economic Stabilization Act of 1970:
The President is authorized to issue such orders and regulations as he deems
appropriate, accompanied by a statement of reasons for such orders and regulations, to
(1)
(2)

stabilize prices, rents, wages, and salaries . . .
stabilize interest rates and corporate dividends and similar transfers at
levels consistent with orderly economic growth ....
Act of Dec. 22, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, §§ 203(a)(1), (2), 85 Stat. 744, amending 12 U.S.C. §
1904 (1970). See also S. 2176, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
4 For a lively debate on this issue, see Green & Nader, Economic Regulation vs. Competi-

tion: Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man, 82 YALE L.J. 871 (1973); Winter, Economic Regulation vs.
Competition: Ralph Nader and Creeping Capitalism, id. at 890; Green & Moore, Winter's
Discontent: Market Failure and Consumer Welfare, id. at 903.

5 Elsewhere, this author has expressed uneasiness at the demise of the Delegation
Doctrine as a tool for judicial review of administrative action. Wright, Book Review, 81 YALE
L.J. 575, 582-87 (1972).
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These observations are not novel, 6 and judges have not failed to
recognize them. A Supreme Court majority recently suggested that
agencies may not use an adjudicatory forum to announce new legal
standards which will have only prospective effect.7 A quarter century ago, the Court advised the agencies that "[t]he function of
filling in the interstices of [an act] should be performed, as much as
possible, through this quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be
applied in the future."'8 Judge Friendly has persuaded the Second
Circuit to take the next logical step, requiring that the National
Labor Relations Board promulgate standards of general application only by means of proper rulemaking procedures.9 The converse claim-that regulated parties have some "right" to an adjudicatory promulgation of general policies merely because these
policies affect important interests or preexisting licenses-has been
decisively rejected.'" And when agencies have asserted long dormant rulemaking powers, the courts have been quick to sustain the
change of heart."
6

There is abundant literature criticizing the administrative agencies for excessive

reliance on adjudicatory procedures. See, e.g., R. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE
OMISSION 11-12 (1970); PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A
NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES

5, 21, 59 (1971) ("ASH COUNCIL" REPORT); Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the
NationalLabor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961). See also I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 6.06 (1958). For a comprehensive analysis of the relative merits of rules and
adjudicatory orders in the making of general policy, see Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative ProcedureReform, 118
U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1970); Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development
of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965). Professor Davis has forcefully argued
that arbitrary administrative action can be effectively curbed only by requiring agencies to
formalize their policies in clear rules of prospective application. See generally K. DAVIS,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE-A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969). Absent promulgation of rules,
administrative adjudications are often chaotic and unfair, for neither the parties nor the
administrators have any clear notion of what legal standards are being applied. See generally
Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards, 75
HARV. L. REV. 863, 1055, 1263 (1962).
' NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969). Splitting seven-two on the
outcome, the Court in Wyman-Gordon upheld an NLRB order which the Board purported to
base on a "rule" adopted at the close of an earlier adjudication and not applied to the parties
to that adjudication. But only three justices thought that this "rule" had any legal force. Id. at
769-75. The four remaining justices in the majority agreed with the minority that the rule
was invalid, but concluded that the NLRB had other legal authority to issue the order in
question. Id. at 765-66.
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947).
Bell Aerospace Co. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485, 495-97 (2d Cir. 1973).
10 See, e.g., FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956); American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966); Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir.
1960).
" See, e.g., Permian Basin Area Rates Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968); National Petroleum
Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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But a general background of judicial applause is not enough.
In rulemaking, no less than in adjudication, Congress has fastened
the courts and agencies into an intimate partnership, 12 the success
of which requires a precarious balance between judicial deference
and self-assertion. In passing on administrative adjudications, the
courts over the years have learned to maintain that balance, but
judicial review of rulemaking is presenting a new and troublesome
question. Some courts have recently shown an inclination to force
rulemakers to adopt trial-like procedures-formal hearings, interrogatories, oral argument, cross-examination, and the like-which
clearly are not required by the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) . 3 Should this tendency become general, rulemaking will
lose most of its peculiar advantages as a tool of administrative
policymaking, and the merits of the many rulemaking experiments
now under way will be denied a fair opportunity to be tested. The
trend in agencies toward over-proceduralization arose largely because reviewing courts were hostile to regulation and were uncritically fond of adjudicatory methods for resolving social
controversies. 4 From the general paralysis of administration which
resulted, the agencies are only now emerging. Before throwing
history into reverse, we in the judiciary should at least pause for
thought.
12 See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
13 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1970).
14 No doubt American regulators adopted trial-like procedures for many reasons. Our
government is peculiarly lawyer-ridden at all levels, and 'Judicial" habits of thought and
practice thus often dominate other possible perspectives. See generally Reich, The Law of the
Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227 (1966). That the first chairman of the ICC was a judge no
doubt helped Congress and the public to view agencies as quasi-courts. See M. BERNSTEIN,
REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 29 (1955); R. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 65 (1941). But judicial review of agency actions has also
played a part. When the courts claimed that ratemaking was "eminently a question for
judicial investigation" (Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418,458 (1890)), and
insisted on weighing de novo the evidence supporting agency actions, administrators
naturally felt called upon to mimic courtroom procedures and to provide regulated industries the full inventory of "adversary" rights. See R. CUSHMAN, supra at 66. Early judicial
attempts to impose adjudicatory procedures on the agencies were motivated by a generally
conservative social philosophy. A contemporary observer protested that "the attempt to read
the procedural predilections of judges into the due process clause is as much to be
condemned as the similar attempt to read economic predilections into the same constitutional provision." Feller, Administrative Procedure and the Public Interest-The Results of Due
Process, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 308, 315 (1940). Chief Justice Stone noted that the legal
profession of our dy, like its predecessors who saw in the pretensions of the
chancellor but a new danger to the common law, has given little evidence that it sees
in this new method of administrative control any opportunity except for resistance
to a strange and therefore unwelcome innovation.
Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REv. 4, 17 (1936).
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I
"FAIRNESS"

IN RULEMAKING AND THE

APA's

PROCEDURES

While procedures for rulemaking, like those for adjudication,
should no doubt promote "fairness," that slippery term has very
different meanings in the two contexts. An adjudication applies a
preexisting legal standard to a small set of controverted facts to
determine whether a particular individual should receive a benefit
or a penalty. An adjudication is fair to the individual only if the
facts are accurately found, and Anglo-American jurisprudence
assumes that accuracy is best served by traditional adversary procedures. But it makes no sense to speak of a rule as being fair or
unfair to an individual in this objective sense of accuracy. A rule
allocates benefits and penalties among large classes of individuals
according to a specific normative standard, and the fairness of such
15
an allocation is ultimately a political or philosophical question.
Thus, in the rulemaking context, fairness is not identified with
accuracy, and procedures designed to maximize accuracy at the
cost of all other values are simply inappropriate.
Nor can adjudicatory procedures be justified on the theory
that fairness affords parties some basic right to participate in the
formulation of rules which may affect them. Administrative agencies derive their sovereignty from Congress, not from the consent
of parties potentially affected by agency rules. Moreover, trial-like
procedures are a thoroughly illogical vehicle for democratically
weighting the views of the interested parties. Such weighting would
require instead the election of administrative policy makers or the
establishment of some formal system by which interest groups
might be represented in the agencies' higher councils.
But there is one sense in which the notion of "fairness" may be
applied to administrative rulemaking. Put simply, the public is
treated unfairly when a rulemaker hides his crucial decisions, or his
reasons for them, or when he fails to give good faith attention to all
the information and contending views relevant to the issues before
him. To this notion of fairness-that rulemaking must be openly
informed, reasoned, and candid-there is a two-fold logic. First, if
administrators rule in obscurity, Congress cannot intelligently de'16
Although a rulemaker may make use of empirical conclusions, these are so dependent on predictions, and on inherently uncertain estimates, that objective terms such as
.accurate" and "inaccurate" will typically have little application. Further, because a
rulemaker must make and coordinate many empirical and normative judgments, the
ultimate shape of the rule seldom "follows from the facts."
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legate power or police the exercise of power already delegated.
Second, although the "public interest" cannot be objectively
defined, one can safely conclude that administrators who ignore
relevant facts and who take the counsel of blind prejudice will serve
the "public interest" only by the operation of chance. Therefore,
although a rulemaker's decisions cannot be "accurate" in the conventional sense, and although regulated parties have no fundamental "right" to participate in rulemaking, the administrator owes a
duty to the public to give serious consideration to all reasonable
contentions and evidence pertinent to the rules he is considering.
The APA provides rulemaking procedures which directly enforce this duty. The procedures are uncluttered by inappropriate
references to the ways of the courtroom or the world of electoral
politics. Section 553 imposes a three-fold obligation on a
rulemaker. First, the rulemaker must give public notice of "the
legal authority under which the rule is proposed" and of "either
the terms of substance of the proposed rule or a description of the
subjects and issues involved," at least thirty days before its effective
date. Second, he must "give interested persons an opportunity to
participate in the ruling making through submission of written
data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral
presentation." Finally, "[a]fter consideration of the relevant matter
presented," the rulemaker must "incorporate in the rules adopted
6
a concise and general statement of their basis and purpose."'
If accorded a properly expansive reading, section 553 provides
a fully adequate scope for judicial review of rulemaking. Certainly,
the courts have not felt cramped by the section's brevity. Recent
cases, for instance, have put useful teeth into the step one notice
provision. If an agency's empirical predictions constitute a substantial basis for its rule, the methodology of prediction should be
made public so that interested parties have an opportunity to study
and criticize it.1 7 If a flat rate is to be set for allocating costs
between two industry services, the agency should specifically inform the public of this result and not merely report that some
method of allocation is contemplated.' 8 If an agency wishes to base
its rulings on facts developed in a corollary adjudication, the
agency must say so, and interested parties must be allowed to
contest the relevance of the adjudicatory record to the contem-

It

5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).

17 See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, No. 72-1073 (D.C. Cir., June 29, 1973)

31-37; cf. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
18See Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1251 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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plated rulings.' 9 It is the common spirit of such decisions that the
agency must make continuous disclosure of the facts and assumptions on which it intends to rely in promulgating its rule. Obviously, this philosophy of candor must also characterize the "basis
and purpose" statement issued by the agency in step three. It
cannot be so "concise" and "general" that the court is faced with
merely conclusory assertions; the agency must show that it truly has
given serious consideration to possible alternative rulings.2 0 Although detailed findings of fact are unnecessary, the reviewing
court may demand reasoned explanations for controversial normative and empirical determinations made by the agency. 2 1 At a
minimum, the statement should refer to relevant submissions by
interested parties and should rebut or accept these submissions in
22
an orderly fashion.
Section 553 contemplates that rules will be made through a
genuine dialogue between agency experts and concerned members
of the public. In policing the three-step procedure, the reviewing
court must satisfy itself that the requisite dialogue occurred and
that it was not a sham.
II
THE AD

Hoc

APPROACH TO PROCEDURAL REVIEW OF RULEMAKING

There is an important difference between interpreting section
553 creatively and simply disregarding it. That section mandates a
dialogue, not a trial. Nothing in section 553 says that a rulemaker
must give individual answers to critical interrogatories, provide oral
hearings, allow cross-examination of experts, or develop a testimo19 See Texas Gulf Coast Area Natural Gas Rate Cases, No. 71-1828 (D.C. Cir., Aug. 24,
1973) 51-52; Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1251 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Compare
Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 746 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972).
20 Pillai v. CAB, No. 73-1408 (D.C. Cir., Aug. 22, 1973) 18-24.
21 See National Air Carrier Ass'n v. CAB, 436 F.2d 185, 198-99 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968). In
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 849-50 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the court, in an
opinion which this author joined, reached similar results, but suggested that it was requiring
more than the APA minimally demanded. This caveat may have been unnecessary. Both the
notice and the "basis and purpose" requirements of § 553 are obviously very flexible, and
should be adapted to the particular rules and issues in the case. Such flexibility may also be
appropriately exercised to reflect intensified standards of substantive review contained in
particular agency statutes. See note 34 and accompanying text infra.
2 Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, No. 72-1073 (D.C. Cir., June 29, 1973) 35.
Obviously, the agency's duty to rationalize its decisions is not met by post hoc rationalizations
offered for the first time by counsel during judicial review of those actions. Burlington
Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167-69 (1962).
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nial record. Section 553 does not prevent agencies from adopting
such procedures if they wish to do so, and in establishing a new
rulemaking authority or agency, Congress may, of course, carve
out exceptions to section 553 or impose procedures beyond those
listed there. Indeed, the APA itself permits Congress to invoke the
full panoply of adjudicatory procedures, set out in sections 556 and
557, simply by stating that rulemaking by a particular agency must
be preceded by a "hearing on the record. 12 3 But if Congress
remains silent, the APA clearly contemplates that reviewing courts
will insist on neither more nor less than section 553 requires.
Some recent lower court decisions, however, have urged upon
rulemaking agencies a variety of procedures not found either in
section 553 or in the particular agency statutes under review.
Consider InternationalHarvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus,24 an exceptionally thoughtful decision rendered last term by a panel of our court.
There the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had decided
not to suspend for one year the Clean Air Act's 1975 standards for
auto emission control. The Act permitted a suspension only if the
EPA Administrator determined that the technology necessary to
meet the 1975 standards was not "available. '2 5 Because the Administrator had determined the availability of such technology by
means of a complex "prediction methodology" never revealed to
the auto companies, the court remanded the case to the EPA to
give "the parties ... [an] opportunity.. . to address themselves to
matters not previously put before them. '2 6 Arguably, this conclusion followed directly from the notice requirement in section 553
of the APA, for the methodology itself was an important "issue"
which the Agency should have publicized for comment and criticism before announcing its final decision.
The court went further, however, stating that
[i]n the remand proceeding . . . we require reasonable crossexamination as to new lines of testimony, and as to submissions
previously made to EPA in the hearing on a proffer that critical
questions could not be satisfactorily pursued by procedures previously in effect.2 7
It is true that the opinion permits the EPA to "confine crossexamination to the essentials, avoiding discursive or repetitive
' 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970); see id. §§ 556, 557.
24 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
25 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-l(b)(5)(D)(iii) (1970).
26 478 F.2d at 649.
27 Id.
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questioning. '2 But the fact remains that neither section 553 nor
the Clean Air Act requires any cross-examination procedure for
rulemaking. The court rested its order simply on "the interest of
'2 9

providing a reasoned decision.
Similarly, in Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC,3 0 the court questioned a

Federal Power Commission rule under the Natural Gas Act 3 ' which
established flat-rate cost figures for transporting various fuels by
pipeline. While acknowledging that the Natural Gas Act did not
require a "hearing on the record" and that the adjudicatory procedures of sections 556 and 557 of the APA were not required, the
court nevertheless held that the FPC could not "proceed with only
the guidance of the . . . standards of section 553. ' 32 The court

reasoned that "artificial distinctions based upon the language of the
APA should be avoided in determining what procedure should be
followed. 3 3 The APA's language was disregarded here because the
Natural Gas. Act requires "substantial evidence" as support for
agency actions.3 4 The court did not dictate any particular proce28 Id. The majority held that these procedures were required on remand in the case, but
did not hold that the EPA had erred in neglecting to use them in its initial disposition of the
case. In his concurring opinion, Judge Bazelon labelled this approach a "bit of judicial
legerdemain"; he would have held such procedures necessary in the agency's original action.
Id. at 652.
29

Id. at 649.

483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
31 15 U.S.C. §§ 717(c), (d) (1970).
32 483 F.2d at 1251.
20

3'Id. at 1252.
3' Id. at 1257-58. Ignoring the APA in this manner reads too much into the term

"substantial evidence." Although the term obviously has its roots in the history of adjudicatory proceedings, it literally establishes a standard of substantive review, not a procedural
requisite. There is no logical impediment to associating this standard of review with the
rulemaking procedures of § 553. See Texas Gulf Coast Area Natural Gas Rate Cases, No.
71-1828 (D.C. Cir., Aug. 24, 1973) 49-50 & n.59; Phillips Petroleum v. FPC, 475 F.2d 842
(10th Cir. 1973); ef. Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 744-45 & n.62 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1074 (1972). Rulemaking procedures generate an "administrative record," which may
be searched for substantial evidence to support the rule decided on. See text accompanying
notes 90-92 infra. This is not to say that the standard of review is wholly unrelated to
"procedural" questions. If a particular rule rests on an extensive analysis of data or on a
complex prediction-which may well be the case with rules subjected to the "substantial
evidence" test by Congress-courts should require the agency to operate the three-step
procedure of § 553 in a manner sensitive to the empirical complexities at stake. The step-one
notice should, for instance, include all the important details of the factfinding methods and
research sources which the agency intends to utilize. And the step-three "basis and purpose'
statement should make detailed reference to all the factual disputes raised by the submissions of interested parties. Most important, the agency should not rely on any research
methods or data which were not presented to the interested parties for comment and
criticism. See Texas Gulf Coast Area Natural Gas Rate Cases, supra at 50. The rulemaking
process established by § 553 is not inflexible; it can vary with the issues involved. The mere
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dures for use on remand, concluding only that "some sort of
35
adversary, adjudicative-type procedures" would be necessary.
Cross-examination and written interrogatories were suggested "by
36
way of illustration.
Although InternationalHarvester and Mobil Oil depart from the
APA with diffidence, dicta in other cases do so rather bluntly. We
are told that the APA's distinctions between informal rulemaking
procedures3 7 and full adjudicatory procedures 38 have been "discarded ... as criteria for determining the type of hearing to which
the parties affected by administrative action are entitled. 3 9 Courts
are to devise mandatory procedures according to the "kind" or
"importance" of the issues in the proceeding. 40 Hearings, for
instance, are deemed necessary whenever "a genuine and substan4
tial issue of fact" has been raised by means of an offer of proof, '
or at least when "the issue presented is one which possesses great
substantive importance, or one which is unusually complex or
difficult to resolve on the basis of pleadings and argument. '4 The
underlying theory of these cases has been accurately conveyed by
Professor Claggett:
In any case where a rulemaking proceeding involves a contested
issue of fact which has a vital bearing on the reasonableness of
the rule and which is readily susceptible to taking of evidence, an
agency may well abuse its discretion if it fails to conduct an
evidentiary hearing even in 43
an area where no statutory right to
an adjudication is involved.
Thus, after an agency has fully completed its consideration and
promulgation of a rule, the reviewing court may demand reconsideration under any procedures which, in retrospect, strike the court
as being appropriate to the issues raised. This curious "ad hoc"
approach to procedural review is not authorized by the APA or by
any other statute; nor should it become the law by judicial fiat.
presence of factual questions in a rulemaking or of a "substantial evidence" standard of
review is thus no reason to substitute formal, adjudicatory procedures for the expeditious
routine of agency notice-comment by parties-agency decision.
35 483 F.2d at 1259.
36 Id. at 1262-63 & n.91.
37 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
38 Id. §§ 556, 557.
'9 Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 1973) (dictum).
40 See Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Marine
Space Enclosures, Inc. v. FMC, 420 F.2d 577, 585-86 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
" Upjohn Co. v. Finch, 422 F.2d 944, 955 (6th Cir. 1970).
42 National Air Carrier Ass'n v. CAB, 436 F.2d 185, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
13 Claggett, Informal Action-Adjudication-Rulemaking: Some Recent Developments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51, 78.
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III
A
A.

CRITIQUE OF THE AD HOC APPROACH TO PROCEDURAL REVIEW

Legal Infirmities

The ad hoc approach contravenes recent, authoritative interpretations of the APA. These interpretations make clear that an
agency does not "abuse its discretion" by declining to utilize procedures more formal than those set out in section 553.44 In United
States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp.4 5 and United States v. Florida
East Coast Ry., 4 6 courts examined Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) regulations aimed at alleviating the nation's chronic freight
car shortage. The Commission had formulated these regulations
through section 553 procedures, taking only written submissions
on its proposals before issuing final rulings. Noting that the Interstate Commerce Act itself requires a "hearing" prior to Commission action, 4 7 the petitioners in both cases claimed that more formal
procedures should have been followed by the ICC. But in
Allegheny-Ludlum, the Supreme Court held that the term "hearing"
in the Interstate Commerce Act is insufficiently close to the APA's
term "hearing on the record" to indicate any congressional desire
to impose on the ICC the adjudicatory procedures of sections 556
and 557.48 In Florida East Coast Ry., the Court held that the ICC's
receipt of written submissions adequately met the "hearing" provision of the Commerce Act.49 The message of these cases is clear.
Courts are not to impose on agencies the formalities of sections 556
and 557 unless Congress has unmistakably so provided, and courts
are not to spin their own procedural requirements from statutory
catch-phrases of uncertain meaning.
If the APA precludes the ad hoc approach, then that approach
can survive only if the Constitution requires it. But there is not
even a colorable claim to this effect. Of course, the due process
clause often confers trial-like procedural rights on an individual
who becomes the focus of a government action.5 0 However, in the
44 See notes 45-49 and accompanying text infra.
45 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
46 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
47 49 U.S.C. § 1 (14)(a) (1970).
48 406 U.S. at 756-58; see 410 U.S. at 234-38.
49 410 U.S. at 238-46.
50 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969); Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); cf.
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
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rulemaking context, the constitutional touchstone remains Mr.
Justice Holmes's opinion for a unanimous court in Bi-Metallic
Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization,5' holding that a hearing
was unnecessary before Colorado tax officials could substantially
increase the valuation of all property in Denver. Bi-Metallic is
nearly sixty years old, but just last term, the Supreme Court cited it
with approval and reemphasized that the due process clause embodies the "recognized distinction in administrative law between
proceedings for the purpose of promulgating policy-type rules or
standards, on the one hand, and proceedings designed to adjudicate disputed facts in particular cases on the other." 52 This need
not mean that the due process clause has no application to rulemaking. Arguably, all government actions must be surrounded by
procedures representing a reasonable balance between fairness and
efficiency. For rulemaking, however, the fairness is owed to the
public generally, not to particular individuals, and there is consequently no reason to doubt that the procedures of section 553
strike other than a reasonable balance.
B. Infirmities of Logic and Policy
Having no foundation in the Constitution or the APA, the ad
hoc approach to procedural review of rulemaking should be rejected as a violation of statutory law. But two general arguments
have been advanced in support of the ad hoc approach: (1) that it
promotes "procedural inventiveness,'

53

and (2) that it somehow

facilitates judicial review of the substance of administrative rules. 5 4
These arguments sound rather good as slogans, but they do not
withstand close scrutiny.
1. ."ProceduralInventiveness"
No one can deny that the ad hoc approach would allow courts
to be "procedurally inventive." Judges could custom tailor procedural requirements to each distinct administrative action and
could thus discontinue what Professor Claggett calls the
"unprofitable exercise" of trying to "draw general and abstract lines
separating areas especially appropriate for formal adjudication
from those more appropriate for rulemaking." 55 But if judges now
51 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
52 Florida East Coast Ry. v. United States, 410 U.S. 224, 244-46 (1973).
11 Claggett, supra note 43, at 70.
14 See text accompanying notes 71-72 infra.
'5 Claggett, supra note 43, at 68.
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have trouble inscribing a clear line between "legislative" and "adjudicatory" actions, 56 how could they reach a consensus on the
appropriate procedures to govern the thousands of actions issuing
annually from the federal bureaucracy? On occasion, an agency
may make a "rule" which applies to only one regulated party, 57 or
it may adopt a new legal standard in an adjudication. 58 Such
administrative perversions obviously raise problems of fairness with
which the courts should deal. 59 But this is no reason to disregard
section 553 when reviewing the vast majority of agency actions
which are indisputably valid exercises of rulemaking power. If
reviewing courts ignored the guidance of section 553 and instead
operated under a vague injunction to find those procedures "best"
suited to each agency action presented, judicial review of rulemaking would become totally unpredictable.
The administrative response would, however, be completely
predictable. Fearing reversal of his substantive initiatives, each
administrator would clothe his agency's actions in the full wardrobe
of adjudicatory procedure. By demanding procedural refinements
on an ad hoc basis, reviewing courts would inadvertently induce
" The problem is discussed in 1 K. DAvIs, supra note 6, § 5.01, at 285. See also American
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
" The problem is mentioned in American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 631
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966). It should be noted, however, that the APA's
definition of a "rule" includes "an agency statement of... particular applicability." 5 U.S.C.
§ 551(4) (1970). Professor Davis reads the legislative history of the Act as suggesting that an
agency action which applied expressly to only one or several named parties might nevertheless be a "rule." I K. DAVIS, supra note 6, at § 5.02. Such a rule might, however, have
considerable trouble surviving an equal protection challenge or the constitutional prohibition
against bills of attainder. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
"8 See, e.g., NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969); SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
332 U.S. 194 (1947); Bell Aerospace Co. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973).
" The fairness problems may be simply articulated; they are not so prolix or multifaceted as to cast a shadow over the basic distinction between rules and adjudicatory orders.
Consider first the making of new rules in an adjudication. The possible unfairness here is
two-fold. If the rule is applied to the parties in the adjudication, the rule is retroactive; the
parties have been denied fair notice of what the law expects of them. Even if the rule's
application is only prospective, its formulation without the participation and comment of all
interested parties constitutes a violation of the public's right to open and informed rulemaking. When a rule applies to only a single party, there are also several problems. Generally,
discrimination between parties is fair only if (1) a rational theory underlies the distinction,
and (2) the theory has been accurately applied to the behavior or empirical traits of the
parties. A rule singling out one party for special treatment will often be invalid for lack of a
rational and permissible basis for the discrimination, a problem which no amount of
adjudicatory procedure will cure. The agency may, however, cite a rational underlying
theory and claim that application of that theory to the world of possible regulated parties in
fact selects out a single party. This is an empirical proposition which is so unlikely, and so
dependent on detailed, fine grain factual determinations, that courts can justifiably demand
that the agency subject the proposition to the test of traditional adjudicatory procedures.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:375

agencies to adopt maximum procedures in all cases. Seeking administrative variety, we would obtain administrative paralysis. The
inherent virtues of rulemaking-expedition, flexibility to experiment, a sensible balance between expertise and broad public
participation-would be forfeited. Like adjudicatory regulation
today, rulemaking would become a lawyer's game.
There is a clear need for procedural innovation in many new
areas of administrative rulemaking. 60 But such innovation can only
come, as the APA contemplates, from Congress or from the agencies themselves. To the extent that oral argument and crossexamination are genuinely useful in illuminating the empirical
questions that course through some rulemaking, it is hardly utopian to rely on Congress and the agencies for a proper response.
In the past decade, most of the major grants of rulemaking
authority made by Congress have specified procedures that exceed
in one way or another those required by section 553.61 The
excessive fondness of the agencies for adjudicatory methods is a
matter of historical record. 62 Therefore, lawyer-like procedures in
the rulemaking context simply do not need the services of an
extra-statutory judicial crusade.
2.

ProceduralReview vs. Substantive Review

In this "new era ' 63 of environmental, economic, and energy
regulation, there would be great attraction to any approach which
genuinely facilitated substantive review of agency rules. In the past
year, this author has personally received a compulsory education in
the intricacies of nuclear breeder reactor development, 64 the
difficulties of pipeline construction through the Alaskan tundra, 65
the effect of different gasoline grades on auto engine
performance,6 6 the economics of air transport between small cities
60 See generally Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Tpe Hearings for Resolving
Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. REv. 111 (1972); Hamilton,
Proceduresfor the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The Need for ProceduralInnovation in
Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1276 (1972).
61 For a useful listing and analysis of recent rulemaking grants containing procedural
guaranties beyond the requirements of § 553, see Hamilton, supra note 60, at 1315-30.
62 See notes 6 & 14 supra.
63 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
64 Scientific Institute for Pub. Information v. AEC, No. 1131 (D.C. Cir., June 12, 1973).
65 Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 463 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd on rehearingen banc,
479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973).
66 National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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in New England, 67 and the differing methods of producing sulphuric acid. 68 This is a rather rich diet for a "generalist" decisionmaker who feels more comfortable with a volume from West
Publishing Company than with a computer print-out. Furthermore, these new rulemaking cases raise questions of the utmost
political urgency. In the Alaskan pipeline litigation, 69 for instance,
the environmental integrity of our largest state was pitted against
the immediate economic needs of its citizens, against the huge
investments of several oil companies, and against the acute energy
and fuel requirements of the entire nation. In the auto emissions
case, the court recognized it was dealing with perhaps "the biggest
industrial judgment that has been made in the United States in this
7 0
century.
But how exactly do the difficulties of substantive review justify
adopting the ad hoc approach to procedural review? Two suggestions have been advanced. Reasoning that agency use of adjudicatory procedure would guarantee the substantive adequacy of
agency rules, Judge Bazelon has argued that the ad hoc approach
could-and should-virtually replace substantive review. 7 1 He fears
that in many of the new areas of rulemaking, the exercise of
substantive review dangerously taxes the competence of courts,
converting them into superagencies charged with second guessing
the technological, scientific, and economic judgments of rulemakers. The other suggestion accepts the need for a wide ranging
67 Eastern Air Lines v. CAB, No. 72-1703 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 3, 1972) (unpublished).

6' Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, No. 72-1072 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 10, 1973).
69 Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 463 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd on rehearingen bane,
479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973).
70 International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
quoting remarks of Senator Baker during debate on the Clean Air Act of 1970. See 116
CONG. REc. 33,085 (1970) (remarks of Senator Baker).
71 Id. at 650-53 (Bazelon, J., concurring); cf. Texas Gulf Coast Area Natural Gas Rate
Cases, No. 71-1828 (D.C. Cir., Aug. 24, 1973). Writing for the majority in the Texas Gulf
Coast case, Judge Bazelon stresses that an agency, in settling rates, must meet a statutory test
of being "just and reasonable," and should "set forth with clarity the grounds for its rejection
of opposing views and the reasons it has arrived at its results." Id. at 108-11. This author is in
full sympathy with that position; indeed the "basis and purpose" requirement of the APA's
§ 553 should be read to demand no less. See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra. But there
is a difference between asking an agency lucidly to justify its actions and requiring the
agency to take action only through adjudicatoryprocedures.Judge Bazelon finds both requisites
necessary to provide "a framework for principled decision-making." Texas Gulf Coast
Natural Gas Rate Cases, supra at 109; International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d
615, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Judge Bazelon's "framework" fails, in my judgment, to take
sufficient account of the distinction between the kinds of "principled decision-making"
required for fairness to an individual, on the one hand, and fairness to the public generally
on the other. See text accompanying notes 15-22 supra.
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substantive review and argues that rulemakers must be forced to
embrace adjudicatory procedures so that an adequate "record" will
72
be developed for such review.
To both of these suggestions, there is a threshold objection:
each tries to facilitate substantive review at the cost of paralyzing
agencies with procedures otherwise irrelevant to sound rulemaking. Surely the court's task can be rendered tolerable without
rendering rulemaking a practical impossibility. Furthermore, both
suggestions misconceive the role of substantive review. Since the
APA not only disallows the ad hoc approach to procedural
review,73 but also requires substantive review, Judge Bazelon's
proposal is doubly doubtful. It is also unnecessary. Subsiantive
review under the APA does not convert the reviewing court into i
superagency. The APA standard of review is singularly undemanding, and it allows adequate play to Judge Bazelon's perception that
courts can often better assess the way rules are made than the
merits of the rules themselves. By the same token, courts do not
need an adjudicatory record to undertake the necessary task of
substantive review. Rather, they can and should review the legally
sanctioned record of rulemaking which must be generated as a
matter of course by section 553 procedures.
a. The APA Requires Substantive Review. Under section 706 of
the APA, the reviewing court must strike down not only those
agency rules which are "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right," but also those actions
Which are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherWise not in accordance with law."' 74 Presumably, the first standard
means that an agency rule must conform to the agency's delegated
power, just as a statute must conform to the Constitution. However, unless the Act's drafters committed a redundancy, the "arbitrary, capricious" standard goes beyond this. It applies to the
factfinding, fact-predicting, and factual reasoning processes which
led the agency to adopt the rule. As Judge MacKinnon has pointed
out, a contrary interpretation would reduce review under the
"arbitrary, capricious" standard to "a relatively futile exercise in
formalism," because a "regulation perfectly reasonable and appropriate in the face of a given problem may be highly capricious if
that problem does not exist. '7 5 This is the precise teaching of the
72 See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1259-60 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Compare
Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601, 619 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 922 (1964).
71 See notes 44-52 and accompanying text supra.
74 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(C), (A) (1970).
75 Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972).
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Supreme Court's important decision in Overton Park v. Volpe. 76
There, the Secretary of Transportation had approved construction
of an interstate highway through a public park, even though
applicable legislation allowed such approval only if no "feasible and
prudent" alternative route existed. Although the Secretary's action
was not a "rule" in the APA sense," the Court nevertheless applied
the "arbitrary, capricious" standard of section 706 and ordered a
"searching and careful" review by the district judge of all the facts,
studies, and expert views which had provided the basis for the
Secretary's action. The purpose of review was to determine
"whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant
factors. ' 8 After Overton Park, it is highly doubtful that courts can
simply avoid substantive review of rulemaking, no matter how
many "procedures" are imposed on the rulemaking agency.
b. The Standard of Review Is Undemanding. While the converse
of arbitrariness and caprice is rationality, the APA authorizes A
reviewing court to demand of rulemakers only the most basic,
minimal sort of rationality. A judge cannot strike down a rule
merely because it seems to him "unreasonable," in the sense of
being unwise or wrong, any more than he could upset congressional legislation for that reason.7 9 Rather, the APA has been
interpreted by the Supreme Court to require only that "th[e]
inquiry into the facts . . . be searching and careful, [and] the
ultimate standard of review [be] a narrow one. The court is not
' 80
empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency."
The reviewing court is not even authorized to examine whether a
rulemaker's empirical conclusions have support in substantial evidence. The APA reserves the substantial evidence test for review of
adjudications and of rules which must be made after a "hearing on
the record." 8 ' This exemption of conventional rulemaking from
the substantial evidence test is very important, because that test is
not itself terribly demanding. Exercising review under it, a court
cannot disturb a factfinder's weightings of conflicting evidence
merely because these seem "clearly erroneous"; only those determinations which are patently unreasonable can be upset.8 2 Finding
76 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
77Id. at 414.
78 Id.

at 416.

79 See 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 6, § 5.03, at 299.
80 Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
81 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970).
82 Appellate courts use the "clearly erroneous" test in reviewing the factual determinations of a trial judge, sitting without a jury, but the les demanding test of "substantial
evidence" is used in reviewing a jury's findings or in determining whether to direct a verdict
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words to formulate a standard of review which is less demanding
than substantial evidence is no easy task.83 It must be conceded that
the cases applying the "arbitrary, capricious" test have not approached this problem with great vigor. 84 Simple logic, however,
suggests a rough answer. If weightings on conflicting evidence
need be only "reasonable" to pass the substantial evidence test, it
follows that they can be less than reasonable and still survive the
"arbitrary, capricious" test. If this is so, the latter standard subjects
a rulemaker to only the most rudimentary command of rationality.
In drawing empirical conclusions, he must give actual, good faith
consideration to all relevant evidentiary factors. If he has in fact
given serious attention to a factor, the weight which he assigns to it
in his final judgments is of virtually no concern to the reviewing
court.
This is not quite so radical as it sounds. Final empirical
conclusions never flow directly or mechanically from the weights
assigned to raw items of evidence. In between, there are typically
several steps of inferential reasoning and, even under the "arbitrary, capricious" test, these presumably must be something more
than exercises in whimsy or free association. Nevertheless, the
"arbitrary, capricious" standard seems to require not an evaluation
of the rulemaker's empirical conclusions, but rather an inquiry into
the basic orderliness of the process by which evidence and alternative rulings were considered. Thus, Overton Park requires that
agency action be "based on a consideration of the relevant
in a jury case. For a cogent discussion of this familiar distinction, see 4 K. DAvis, supra note
6, § 29.02, at 118-22.
83 Indeed, Professor Davis thinks the task an impossible one. Id. § 29.07, at 149. He
believes that the "substantial evidence" test itself is made of "rubber" rather than "wood" and
is therefore capable of supporting de facto standards of review with widely differing degrees
of rigor. Id. § 29.02, at 126. This view is not necessarily inconsistent with the suggestions in
the text. In speaking of the "reasonableness" or "rationality" of an agency's empirical
determinations, we may obviously mean many different things. While these differing
meanings may constitute a continuous spectrum which cannot be neatly broken into discrete
segments, it may nevertheless be possible to give a rough characterization of that end of the
spectrum represented by the "arbitrary, capricious" standard of review.
84 For example, the court in Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972), contented itself with pointing out that the "arbitrary, capricious" test and the "substantial evidence" test both derive from the "general principle" that
"the object of review is to determine whether a reasoned conclusion from the record as a
whole could support the premise on which the Commission's action rests." In Overton Park
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971), the Court actually suggested that the "arbitrary,
capricious" test authorizes a reviewing judge to upset "a clear error of judgment" by the
agency. Such language contains inappropriate echoes of the "clearly erroneous" standard of
review and is inconsistent with Overton Park's own admonition that a reviewing court "is not
empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency." Id.
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factors," 85 and a later case mandates that rulemakers conduct "a
considered evaluation of the presently available alternatives. ' 6
These phrases mark out a realistic approach to substantive review.
The empirical judgments at stake in rulemaking necessarily rest on
prediction, for a rule has prospective application only, and agency
rules typically involve issues of great technical complexity. Reviewing judges can make a valuable contribution to the rationality of
rulemaking by asking questions such as: "Did you take this factor
into account?" "What about this possibility?" But once the court is
satisfied that the administrator did touch all the bases, absent
obvious irrationality, there is little more a court can accomplish.
Judges lack the special skills to evaluate sensibly the weightings
assigned to technically abstruse evidence; only future historians can
assess the merits of a rulemaker's predictions.
This analysis of substantive review undermines Judge
Bazelon's proposal that substantive review be replaced by the ad
hoc approach to procedural review. Substantive review, properly
understood, is too modest an enterprise to convert courts into
superagencies, and the standard of substantive review itself incorporates Judge Bazelon's underlying, and correct, perception that
courts can more competently assess the rationality of the rulemaking process than the merits of the resultant rules. The problem
with the ad hoc approach to procedural review is that it goes well
beyond this sound perception. The ad hoc approach mandates that
the courts prescribe precise and formal methods for bureaucratic
policymaking. This mandate assumes an expertise in administrative
science which duty on the bench simply does not confer. By
contrast, the "arbitrary, capricious" standard of substantive review
authorizes courts merely to scrutinize the actual making of a rule
for signs of blind prejudice or of inattention to crucial evidence-a
task of straightforward detective work which is well within the
capacities of generalist judges.
Replacing substantive review with the ad hoc approach to
procedural review would make sense only if adjudicatory formalities constituted both a necessary and a sufficient condition for
the rulemaking process to be rational. Neither branch of this
proposition is sound. Rulemaking is adequately rational, under the
APA, so long as the administrator is presented with all relevant
evidentiary factors, gives serious consideration to those factors, and
85 Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
86 Pillai v. CAB, No. 73-1408 (D.C. Cir., Aug. 22, 1973) 3.
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uses reason rather than whim to progress from initial assumptions
to final conclusions. Let us take these requisites in turn.
For purposes of presenting evidence, formalized adjudicatory
methods are clearly inessential: The three-step procedure of section 55387 is expressly designed to provide the administrator access
to all data, criticisms, suggestions, alternatives, and contingencies
relevant to his decisions. Adjudicatory methods are in fact
insufficient to this task. A rulemaker must typically make and
coordinate many empirical conclusions dependent on raw material
outside the conventional evidentiary categories of "testimony" and
"exhibits." For example, the rulemaker must often draw upon
prior experience, expert advice, the developing technical literature,
ongoing experiments, or seasoned predictions.
As for the consideration given to these factors, a rulemaker
can surely demonstrate his seriousness and good faith without
allowing interested parties to cross-examine him or quarrel orally
before him. He can, for instance, through the "basis and purpose"
statement,8 8 detail for the court the actual attention he gave to the
factors, and explain his final disposition with respect to each of
them. It would indeed be insufficient for him to listen passively to
the contentions of the best financed and most skillfully represented
formal "parties." An agency is not ajudge or a sequestered juror. It
cannot "act as an umpire blandly calling balls and strikes for
adversaries appearing before it; the right of the public must receive active and affirmative protection at the hands of the
Commission. ' 89 Further, an administrator's attendance at an adjudicatory hearing does not guarantee that he has given good faith
attention to all the disparate factors bearing relevantly on his
decisions. Indeed, mere attendance does not even ensure attention
to factors raised in the hearing itself.
Finally, no form of procedure can ensure the minimal rationality of a rulemaker's inferences. These after all occur within his
head! To see whether he has kept the counsel of reason, the
reviewing court must in each instance demand an orderly explanation of. the rulemaker's inferences. For such an explanation, logic
suggests no procedural substitute.
c. Substantive Review Operates on an "Administrative" Record.
87 See notes 16-22 and accompanying text supra.
88 See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.

89 Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966); cf. Office of Communications of the United Church of
Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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That rulemakers should use adjudicatory procedures merely to
provide courts with a "record" of those procedures is an argument
which may charitably be termed circular. If courts adopt this
curious theory, their partnership with the agencies will be transformed into a quaint minuet. Substantive review is an inquiry into
the realities of the rulemaking process, not an occasion for pretending that agencies are some species of lower court.90 Consequently, a proper record must reflect all of the relevant views and
evidence considered by the rulemaker, from whatever source,
and-like a mini-history-it must reveal if and how the rulemaker
considered each factor throughout the process of policy formation.
Such is the "full administrative record" adverted to in Overton Park
and its progeny. 91 To provide such a record is one of the functions
of the three-step procedure in section 553. If that provision receives the broad interpretation and strict enforcement which it
merits, 92 the reviewing court will be provided the following record:
Step one of section 553 will yield the agency's initial proposal,
its tentative empirical findings, important advice received from
experts, and a description of the critical experimental and
methodological techniques on which the agency intends to rely.
Step two will produce the written or oral replies of interested
parties to the agency's proposals and to all the other "step one"
materials. And step three will furnish the final rule, accompanied
by a statement both justifying the rule and explaining its normative
and empirical predicates through reference to those parts of the
record developed in steps one and two.
Section 553 thus opens a broad window on the rulemaking
process, surely broad enough to reveal any unfairness to the public
committed by the rulemaker. At the same time, the window is not
so large as to invite a judicial breaking and entering. By generating
a unique sort of "record," the APA's procedures simultaneously
facilitate and carefully channel the exercise of substantive review.
Upsetting those procedures would almost certainly disturb the
appropriate balance between skepticism and deference in substantive review itself.
" The Supreme Court has said that:
[T]o assimilate the relationship of these administrative bodies and the courts to the
relationship between lower and upper courts is to disregard the origin and purposes of the movement for administrative regulation and at the same time to
disregard the traditional scope, however far-reaching, of the judicial process.
FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 144 (1940).
91 Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971). See also Automotive Parts &
Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 336-37 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
92 See text accompanying notes 17-22 supra.
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IV
THE MECHANICS

OF RESTRAINT

When based on a proper administrative record, the mechanics
of review are quite straightforward. If the subject matter of a rule
falls within an agency's delegated authority, there are only two
grounds for a court upsetting it. First, the "basis and purpose"
statement given by the agency may include no reasons, or merely
conclusory reasons, for adopting the rule or for rejecting evidence,
criticisms, or alternatives submitted by outsiders. In this instance,
the agency has violated the third procedural step of section 553
and simultaneously has violated the "substantive" standard of review by failing to show good faith consideration to all relevant
factors. No matter how the agency's default is labelled, the remedy
is of course to remand the rule. But such remand is only to allow
the agency, through fuller explanation, to show that the rulemaking process was actually animated by reason rather than blind
instinct.9 3 Since the "basis and purpose" statement is part of the
"record," as well as a "procedure," this is in essence a remand "for
a fuller record." But there should be no suggestion that the agency
need take more submissions from outsiders, and certainly no
suggestion that adjudicatory procedures are required. 94
Second, remand will be proper when the agency has relied on
important findings, assumptions, or techniques not made public
prior to the rule's promulgation. In this instance, the agency has
violated step one of the section 553 procedures. Since the unfairness here is to the public and not to an individual "party," the
remedy is to instruct the agency to return to step one, not to order
a legally impermissible adjudicatory consideration of issues theretofor unrevealed by the agency.
Compared to this simple routine, the ad hoc approach to
procedural review assigns to the judiciary a relentlessly "activist"
role. In some other areas of law, this author has not found such a
93 Courts often remand agency actions with the understanding that the action need not
be changed so long as the agency can supply a satisfactory legal justification for the action.
See, e.g., FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 249-50 (1972); SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, No. 72-1072 (D.C. Cir., Sept.
10, 1973) 23 n.40.
94 Of course, the basis supplied for an action must not be simply a post-hoc rationalization for action that was essentially arbitrary when taken. See, e.g., Burlington Truck Lines v.
United States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962). And it cannot be based on evidence or methods of which
the regulated public received no prior notice. See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
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role uncongenial."5 But the ad hoc approach to administrative
review lacks those foundations in law and reason which an activist
posture requires. The approach has no statutory underpinnings;
indeed, it flies in the face of the APA. It can claim no constitutional
mandate, and it certainly protects no minority interests which the
political system would otherwise ignore. Furthermore, the approach draws on no talents peculiar to the judiciary. Although we
judges may have a professional attachment to cross-examination
and oral argument, we have no special expertise in the procedure
appropriate to bureaucratic policymaking.
What reviewing courts can realistically do to improve rulemaking is just what the APA asks them to do-open the agencies to
outside information, challenge, and scrutiny. Before dismissing this
as a demeaning or trivial task, we should recall how many agencies
have become captives of private interests, closed to new methods or
regulation and planning, and dedicated to obscuring their policies
from the public and Congress. In sections 553 and 706, the APA
provides the courts with powerful tools to attack these abuses. We
should learn to use these tools and give up playing arcane procedural games authorized by neither statute nor common sense.
"' See Wright, ProfessorBickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARv. L.
RFv. 769 (1971); Wright, The Role of the Supreme Courtin a DemocraticSociety-JudicialActivism
or Restraint, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1968).

